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Abstract

The Limits of “Rational Design”

John S. Duffield

“The Rational Design of International Institutions” (special issue of IO, autumn 2001) makes a
significant contribution to the theoretical literature on international institutions. It is important,
however, to recognize the limits of the Rational Design project in its current form and of the
conclusions that can be drawn from the special issue about the project’s usefulness and validity.
This paper evaluates the project on its own terms, as a rationalist attempt to explain variation in
international institutions. It identifies three significant sets of limitations: those of the scope of
the project, those of the analytical framework, and those of the efforts that are made to evaluate
the framework through empirical analysis. Although the first set of limitations is largely a matter
of choice, the last two raise questions about how much of an advance the special issue in fact
represents. Nevertheless, these shortcomings are not absolute but can be remedied through
further theoretical and empirical research.
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“The Rational Design of International Institutions” (special issue of IO, autumn 2001)
makes a significant contribution to the theoretical literature on international institutions. It
addresses an important and interesting question – how to explain variation in institutional forms
– and offers a promising analytical framework for doing so. Like regime theory in the 1980s,
this framework potentially encompasses a wide range of empirical phenomena. But in contrast
to initial formulations of regime theory, it systematically identifies multiple dimensions of
institutional variation and offers potentially testable conjectures about the relationship between
them and a variety of possible determinants.
At the same time, however, it is important to recognize the current limits of the Rational
Design project and of the conclusions that can be drawn from the special issue about the
project’s usefulness and validity as an explanation of institutional variation. As opposed to the
critique offered by Alexander Wendt as part of that special issue, which presents what is
primarily an “external” perspective, this paper seeks to evaluate “The Rational Design of
International Institutions” on its own terms, as a rationalist attempt to explain international
institutions. It identifies three significant sets of limitations. Some concern the scope of the
project. Others are to be found in the analytical framework as presented. And yet others pertain
to the efforts that are made to evaluate the framework through empirical analysis.
Although the first set of limitations is largely a matter of choice, the last two raise serious
questions about the ability of the Rational Design project in its current state of development to
offer a compelling and satisfactory explanation of institutional forms. Nevertheless, these
shortcomings are not absolute but can be remedied through further theoretical and empirical
research. A concluding section offers suggestions for how this might be done.

5

I. Limitations in Scope
The purposes of the Rational Design project are stated clearly in the first and last articles,
both of which are co-authored by Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. In
the first article, they write that “Our main goal is to offer a systematic account of the wide range
of design features that characterize international institutions.”1 And in the concluding article,
they reiterate that “The main aim of the Rational Design project was to develop an explanatory
framework and begin to test it against available empirical evidence.”2
Accordingly, the special issue consists of two principal parts. The first article lays out
the basic analytical framework of the project. After offering a definition of international
institutions, it specifies the dependent and independent variables that will be the subject of
inquiry and then derives a set of informal “conjectures” linking the two sets of variables. The
framework article is followed by eight articles that focus on international institutions in a range
of issue-areas. Several of these articles seek to extend and elaborate upon the framework, but
most of them involve attempts to evaluate the framework and the conjectures derived from it
against empirical material. In the final article, Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal summarize the
findings of the empirical articles, discuss what they view as some of the broader implications,
and then address the gap Wendt identifies between the positivist aspirations of the project and
the normative questions associated with the actual process of institutional design. They conclude
that “[i]n general, the results strongly support the conjectures” and that although the framework
may have limitations, these do not diminish its value and that some of the most obvious
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omissions can be readily incorporated.3
One question that should be immediately asked of any such theoretically-oriented
enterprise concerns the breadth of its applicability. Obviously, no single research project can do
everything, especially in the span of a single special issue. But it is nevertheless important to
make clear what lies outside the scope of the project as well as what it comprehends. Two
particular limitations of scope are noted here: the empirical domain to which the project applies
and the types of questions that are asked.

A. A Narrow Conception of Institutions
A first significant limitation of the Rational Design project concerns the range of
international institutions to which it applies. Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal are to be
commended for offering a definition of international institutions at the very outset: “explicit
arrangements, negotiated among international actors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize
behavior.”4 One problem with this definition, which becomes clear in the following pages, is
that it does not readily accommodate all of the types of international institutions that Koremenos,
Lipson, and Snidal aspire to analyze. Although they state that the definition includes formal
international organizations, subsequent references to international organizations as agents or
actors that perform various functions do not fit easily with the conception of institutions as
arrangements that simply “prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behavior.”5
Nevertheless, this definitional flaw could be easily remedied. Of greater significance
3
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therefore is the fact that the definition clearly excludes a wide range of other important
international institutional forms. The organizers explicitly exclude “tacit bargains and implicit
guidelines,” describing them as general forms of cooperation. The problem here is that
influential previous definitions of international institutions frequently included such forms. For
example, the early “consensus” definition of international regimes refers to implicit as well as
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures.6 Likewise, Robert Keohane’s
influential definition of international institutions embraces “implicit rules and understandings.”7
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal seem less aware of the fact that their definition also
excludes constitutive institutions. By now, most students of institutions would agree that
institutions do more than just “prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behavior.” In addition, they
sometimes create actors, endow them with certain capabilities, and define categories of action.
In other words, institutions may “create the very possibility of engaging in conduct of a certain
kind.”8 Moreover, such institutions often take the form of explicit, negotiated arrangements.
Thus the U.N. Charter creates the Security Council as well as a number of other bodies and
defines their powers and the actions they may take.
Perhaps most fundamentally, the definition completely ignores those international
institutions that are primarily intersubjective in nature. Kratochwil and Ruggie have pointed out
that regimes and social institutions more generally have an inescapable intersubjective quality. 9
As such, they are fundamentally ideational phenomena involving ideas that are shared by
6
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members of a collectivity.10
This truncated conception of international institutions is reinforced by the narrow focus
on negotiated forms. The Rational Design project considers only those institutions that are “the
fruits of agreement” and “the self-conscious creations of states” and other international actors.11
Scholars have long recognized, however, that international institutions may arise through other
processes as well. For example, Oran Young has identified two additional developmental
sequences, involving self-generating or spontaneous arrangements and imposed arrangements,
respectively.12 The Rational Design project nowhere recognizes the possibility of imposition,
even though it can be an important source of “explicit arrangements...that prescribe, proscribe,
and/or authorize behavior” and is no less likely to guided by rational calculation. And although
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal belatedly acknowledge and briefly discuss the possibility of
spontaneous and evolutionary processes, they do not address their implications for the types of
institutions that may result.13 In fact, these processes are likely to be the source of many
constitutive and perhaps all primarily intersubjective institutions.
Of course, no research project on international institutions should be obliged to subsume
the full range of manifestations of the subject. Indeed, it may not be possible to talk in a
meaningful way about the “rational design” of many types of international institutions. At the
same time, many international institutions do fit the definition of explicit, negotiated
arrangements, ensuring that the Rational Design project will apply to a large number of cases.
10
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Nevertheless, when a project’s embrace of a phenomenon is less than universal, it is important to
make clear in the definition what is excluded as well as what is included.

B. A Limited Set of Questions
A second limitation of the Rational Design project concerns the types of questions that it
asks. Many of the early attempts to develop general theories of international institutions -primarily in the guise of international regimes -- in the 1970s and 1980s focused on them as
dependent variables. Whether or not international institutions actually mattered was largely
assumed. Only in the 1990s did scholarly attention increasingly focus on their effects. As
Martin and Simmons observed in their 1998 review of the institutional literature, “the strength of
[the rationalist] approach has largely been its ability to explain the creation and maintenance of
international institutions. It has been weaker at delineating their effects on state behavior and
other significant outcomes...”14 Consequently, they argued that “research should increasingly
turn to the question of how institutions matter in shaping the behavior of important actors in
world politics.”15
The Rational Design project, however, moves in the opposite direction, revisiting
international institutions as dependent variables. To be sure, much important work remains to be
done on the determinants of international institutions. But insofar as the theoretical literature is
further developed in this area, this choice of focus requires a greater degree of justification and
any resulting claims must necessarily be subjected to a relatively higher level of scrutiny. In
particular, the claims must, at a minimum, be explicitly evaluated against previous attempts to
14
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explain variations in institutional form in order to establish the value added.16

II. Limitations of the Framework
Having clarified the scope of the Rational Design project, the next step is to assess the
adequacy of the analytical framework presented by Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal as a basis for
developing generalizations about institutional design. In fact, although the framework represents
a reasonable first cut, it nevertheless contains significant shortcomings, which can be found in
each of the three main components: the specification of dependent variables, the specification of
independent variables, and the derivation of hypothesis-like conjectures linking the two.

A. Dependent Variables
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal highlight five dimensions of institutional variation, which
become the dependent variables of the Rational Design project: membership rules, scope of
issues covered, centralization of tasks, rules for controlling the institutions, and flexibility of
arrangements. As a starting point, this is a useful conceptualization, one that seeks to strike a
balance between the competing demands of distinguishing the most important institutional
features and producing a framework that is both manageable in size and susceptible to empirical
testing. Nevertheless, it does raise some questions.
One question is whether the framework includes all the most important dependent
variables. Other noteworthy studies of international institutions have emphasized different
dimensions of variation. For example, Jeffrey Legro, in his study of international norms,

16
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identifies specificity as an important variable.17 And the special issue of International
Organization on “Legalization and World Politics” highlights three dimensions – obligation,
precision, and delegation – that find no direct parallels in the Rational Design project.18
Although there is no canonical set of dependent variables that must be included in every study, at
least some discussion of logical alternatives and the reasons for excluding them is warranted.
That said, there may be more overlap in this regard between the Rational Design project
and previous studies than is readily apparent. For example, precision and specificity could be
elements of flexibility. Likewise, delegation could in principle be closely related to
centralization. Nevertheless, these possible links are obscured by an excessive degree of
generality. The authors acknowledge that “[i]n some cases, our dimensions must be refined to
clarify design issues in specific institutions.”19 Arguably, however, at least some further
disaggregation should have been attempted at the outset in order to ensure adequate
conceptualization of the variables and to facilitate the subsequent evaluation of the framework.
The problems that result from excessive aggregation are perhaps most apparent in the
case of centralization, which refers to the performance of important institutional tasks by “a
single focal entity.”20 Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal recognize that “Centralization, for
instance, is a broad category – perhaps too broad for some cases”21 and they conclude that
“because our conception of centralization is very broad, an important avenue of inquiry will be to
17
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refine this concept into its different components.”22 In particular, they envision a finer
differentiation of tasks.23
In focusing on the question of which tasks are centralized, however, Koremenos, Lipson,
and Snidal overlook the equally important question of how tasks are centralized. Most if not all
formal international organizations involve some centralization of tasks. In some instances,
however, these tasks are performed by intergovernmental bodies consisting of the entire
membership, in other cases they are performed by bodies consisting of but a subset of the
members (e.g., the U.N. Security Council), and in yet others they are delegated to supranational
bodies (e.g., the European Commission).24 The brief reference to “a single focal entity” obscures
this important dimension of potential institutional variation. Likewise, the discussion of
centralization does not address the related issues of authority and capabilities. A body may
possess the authority to perform a particular task but not the capability to do so, and vice versa.
More generally, this discussion underscores the need to pay attention to the critical constitutive
choices involved in the design of many international institutions.

B. Independent Variables
Despite these limitations, much more problematic is the Rational Design project’s
22
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specification of independent variables. Four sets of these are included in the framework:
distribution problems; enforcement problems; number of actors and the asymmetries among
them; and uncertainty about others’ behavior, the state of the world, and others’ preferences.25
Once again, the project fails even to discuss systematically other obvious candidates, especially
those that have figured prominently in previous rationalist analyses of institutions, and to explain
why they are excluded. Certainly, a number of possibilities exist. As a result of this omission,
one is justified in questioning from the outset how complete – and thus satisfactory -- an
explanation of institutional choice the project is likely to be able to provide.
First, the framework contains no explicit discussion of interests. In contrast, the starting
point of most rationalist analyses of international institutions as dependent variables is the
interests -- or preferences over outcomes -- of the actors. As Stephen Krasner noted two decades
ago, “The prevailing explanation for the existence of international regimes is egoistic selfinterest.”26 To be sure, rationalist analyses often move on to examine the cooperation problems
that result from different constellations of actor interests.27 But the fact that interests are among
the ultimate determinants of institutional outcomes – or, in Krasner’s terminology, the basic
causal variables – and therefore deserving of explicit mention is not in dispute.
Likewise, a number of rationalist -- not to mention neorealist -- analyses of institutions
have also considered the power, or capabilities, of actors as an additional key determinant.28 Yet
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal devote only one paragraph (under number of actors) to a
25
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discussion of the implications of differences in the distribution of actors’ capabilities. They seek
to compensate somewhat for this neglect with a two-page discussion of the role of power in the
final article, where they state that power considerations are highly compatible with the
framework.29 Nevertheless, they offer little or no discussion of the types of capabilities that may
matter or the circumstances under which they may influence institutional choices.
This inattention to power is especially troubling in view of the frequency with which
distribution problems appear in the case studies (six of the eight). These are precisely the
situations in which previous analyses have argued that capabilities are likely to play a central
role in determining institutional outcomes.30 Even if one accepts the project’s exclusion of
developmental sequences that might involve the use of coercion, moreover, the ability to make
side payments may greatly influence negotiations over institutional forms. The implication of
this omission is that if the objective is to explain institutional choice, the framework may apply
in only a very restrictive set of circumstances: those in which actors either lack or are unwilling
to exploit their capabilities to coerce or to offer inducements for the purpose of obtaining
institutions that better serve their individual interests.
A third common rationalist variable that does not appear in the framework is the presence
or absence of potentially useful institutions. Whether or not an institution involving more or less
the same potential set of states and operating in a related issue area already exists would
presumably have a major impact on institutional choice. In particular, given the various costs
involved in creating institutions, actors seeking to pursue common interests in a new area may
prefer to make use of pre-existing institutions wherever possible rather than start from scratch,
29
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especially if they are assumed to be risk-averse, as the project does. In such circumstances, the
focus shifts from determining which new institutional design is most rational to asking when and
to what degree the actors will avail themselves of pre-existing institutional arrangements.
The issue of institutional path-dependence is briefly touched upon in the framework
article,31 although not in the discussion of the independent variables, and then revisited in the
conclusion under the heading of “Dynamics of Institutional Change.”32 But these brief mentions
are insufficient to do justice to the subject. For example, there is no recognition of the concept of
institutional assets, which may be essential for explaining the continued reliance on international
organizations such as NATO and the IMF that have outlived many if not all of their original
purposes.33 In fact, the authors implicitly acknowledge the importance of institutional pathdependence when they note that the number of actors is “often determined by prior political and
institutional arrangements.”34 And one of the following case studies is exclusively concerned
with actors’ choices among pre-existing institutional fora.35 Consequently, it is all the more
puzzling that this potential causal factor did not receive more explicit attention in the framework.
Also missing from the framework is any discussion of the role of ideas, which have
appeared with increasing frequency in rationalist explanations of individual behavior and
collective outcomes. Goldstein and Keohane have distinguished among three different types of

31
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ideas that may influence policy: world views, causal beliefs, and principled beliefs.36 These
distinctions are highly isomorphic to the categories of norms and principles and knowledge
included in Krasner’s typology of variables that explain regime development, although he treats
the latter as an intervening rather than a basic causal variable.37
Ideational factors such as world views and cause-effect beliefs -- or knowledge – provide
answers to a set of basic questions that rational actors must typically answer before they can
determine which course of action is likely to maximize their utility. In particular, knowledge
may play an important role in shaping institutional design by influencing among other things
how issues are defined, what are regarded to be the relevant actors, which institutional options
are seen to exist, and the expected consequences of different institutional choices. For their part,
however, Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal at most hint at the possibility that institutional scope is
sometimes determined by cognitive factors in a brief reference to how issues are framed.38
Rationalist analyses sometimes also invoke principles in order to account for the interests
or preferences of actors.39 In contrast, behavioral norms would seem to be incompatible with the
rationalist assumption of utility maximization. Nevertheless, they too might merit at least some
discussion insofar as they figure prominently in more general explanations of institutional
choice.40 Indeed, Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal come close to acknowledging the potentially
important role of norms when they note that institutions “may build on less formal arrangements
36
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that have evolved over time and are then codified and changed by negotiation,”41 and at least one
of the following case studies focuses on a set of “normative values” and “informal
understandings” that were formalized in treaty form.42
Instead of interests, power, pre-existing institutions, or ideas, the analytical framework
places primary emphasis on distribution and enforcement problems as independent variables. As
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal admit in the conclusion, “The Rational Design project has one
overriding aim: to make explicit the connections between specific cooperation problems and
their institutional solutions.”43 Certainly, these relationships are important and well worth
exploring, as other seminal theoretical studies have done before.44 But the characterization of
cooperation problems as independent variables is problematic, especially in view of the
alternatives that were not explicitly considered in the framework.
In fact, distribution and enforcement problems are themselves the result of more basic
causal variables. Whether or not a particular type of cooperation problem exists and how severe
it is depend critically on how a situation is perceived, which actors are potentially involved, and
the interests, power, and beliefs of those actors.45 A change in any of those factors may alter the
nature of the problem.
It could perhaps be argued that different types of cooperation problems serve as a useful
41
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shorthand for particular combinations of such more fundamental variables. Koremenos, Lipson,
and Snidal note in the conclusion that they asked the contributors “to specify preference
configurations in terms of distribution and enforcement problems relevant to their cases.”46
Nevertheless, insofar as it is impossible to characterize a cooperation problem without reference
to underlying interests, power distributions, and beliefs, the latter deserve to be made an explicit
part of the analytical framework.
Moreover, the failure to include them explicitly may undermine the validity of any causal
inferences that are drawn. Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal claim in the conclusion that the
omission of power from the analytical framework carries no risk of omitted variable bias since
“it is not at all clear that power should be correlated with our independent variables.”47 In fact,
however, power considerations can significantly determine the intensity of distribution and
enforcement problems by influencing relative gains concerns and the cost of the “sucker’s
payoff,” respectively.

C. Conjectures
The framework culminates with a series of conjectures that link the dependent and
independent variables. The authors are careful to differentiate these implicitly from hypotheses
by noting that they represent generalizations but are not formally derived. Nevertheless, the
conjectures play a vital role in the project by providing a bridge between the framework and the
empirical articles.
Immediately apparent is the absence of a systematic linkage between the dependent and
46
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independent variables. Depending upon how one counts the variables, the authors may offer
conjectures for fewer than half (16 of 35) of the possible causal relationships (see Table 1). Even
the two types of cooperation problems are each linked by conjectures to only three of the five
dependent variables. Although there is no logical reason why every independent variable should
potentially influence every dependent variable in the framework, this lack of comprehensiveness,
which goes unremarked, raises further questions about the criteria by which the variables were
selected.
One must also ask how much of an advance the set of conjectures offered represents upon
the existing scholarly literature. In order to address this question, it may be useful to focus on
the conjectures concerning centralization. These are not only the most numerous (four versus
three for each of the other dependent variables), but they are also evaluated most frequently in
the case studies and figure among the “three general observations [that] stand out among [the]
empirical results.”48
Perhaps the most extensive previous theoretical discussion of centralization appears in
Lisa Martin’s “Interests, Power, and Multilateralism.”49 Although the avowed purpose of that
article is described in different terms -- “to explain variation in the organizing principles and
strength of [formal multilateral] organizations on the basis of the strategic problems facing
states” -- it is directly relevant to the question at hand.50 Indeed, at one point Martin explicitly
48
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equates formal organizations with “centralization.”51
In fact, Martin largely anticipates the Rational Design project’s conjectures about
centralization and goes beyond them in one important respect. Similar to Koremenos, Lipson,
and Snidal, Martin argues that situations involving substantial incentives to defect from
agreements (“collaboration problems” in Martin, “enforcement problems” in Koremenos,
Lipson, and Snidal) should lead to relatively strong organizations.52 Martin further argues that
games involving “major distributional implications” (“coordination problems” in her
terminology) do not require strong institutions, which is consistent with the fact that Koremenos,
Lipson, and Snidal do not offer a conjecture linking centralization with distribution problems.53
Unlike Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, Martin’s analysis does not explicitly address the impact
of number, although she does note that multilateral organizations do “typically have a large
number of members” and summarizes the logical reasons why this might be the case.54
Likewise, although Martin nowhere discusses behavioral uncertainty per se, she does mention
that multilateral organizations could deal with difficulties such as “opportunities for undetected
free riding.”55 Finally, Martin devotes several pages, under the subject of “assurance problems,”
to a discussion of how uncertainty over preferences may generate a demand for formal
organizations for the purpose of centralized information exchange. Although she recognizes that
the role of formal organizations in assurance games will be limited to this function, the lack of a
51
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corresponding conjecture linking uncertainty over preferences to centralization in the Rational
Design framework is puzzling, especially given the prominence of informational considerations
in all four of the existing centralization conjectures.56
To the extent that one can raise questions about the originality of the individual
conjectures, perhaps the greatest potential contribution of the framework lies in its ability to
suggest when variation in a particular independent variable will be accompanied by variation in a
particular dependent variable. As Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal rightly recognize, institutional
design may involve choices among multiple institutional equilibria. There may be no unique
institutional arrangement that best addresses a particular combination of problems associated
with distribution, enforcement, numbers, and uncertainty. Unfortunately, however, although
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal identify the basic ways in which the dependent variables may
interact among themselves – as substitutes, complements, or conflicts57 – they “do not offer any
arguments that explain when one approach would be used in place of another or when different
design combinations might be chosen.”58

III. Limitations of the Empirical Evaluation
The bulk of the Rational Design special issue consists of eight “empirical” articles.
These articles serve several functions, including developing the conjectures further and
56
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extending the theoretical framework. Arguably, however, their most important purpose is to
“[evaluate the] conjectures in the context of many different areas of international politics.”59 As
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal note, “The ultimate value of our framework depends on its
ability to explain phenomena across a range of substantive issues.”60
Obviously, the task of evaluating the many conjectures cannot be completed in a single
volume. Nevertheless, one might reasonably expect that, in the course of eight carefully chosen
and well-designed case studies spanning more than 200 pages, a good deal of progress could be
made. In fact, however, because of problems with the choice and execution of the cases, they are
able to provide at best a very limited evaluation.

A. Case Selection
Although the empirical cases studies do cover a number of areas, they can hardly be said
to be representative of the full range of substantive issues. Five of the eight articles deal with
economic issues, and of those, three are primarily concerned with trade arrangements. Two
more articles address security issues, but one of those concerns institutional arrangements -POW treaties -- that are relatively peripheral to the core security interests of states while the
other focuses narrowly on the criteria for admitting new members to NATO. Only one article
covers environmental and natural resource issues, while none are devoted to such areas as broad
political and diplomatic relations, human rights, science and technology, health, culture, and
education, among others.
Nevertheless, even a substantively unrepresentative set of cases could be used to conduct
59
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a qualified evaluation of the conjectures, if properly framed. Ideally, the cases would be as
comparable as possible while exhibiting variation along one or more of the dimensions of
interest. In fact, however, they fall well short of achieving this methodological desideratum.
Above all, few of the cases fit neatly with the project’s stated focus on the rational design
of explicit, negotiated arrangements. Three of the cases, arguably, are at best tangential. The
subject of the article by Pahre is centralized bargaining, or “clustering,” yet as Pahre himself
admits, “clustering does not meet the Rational Design definition of an institution.”61 Morrow’s
article on POW treaties deals with “normative values” and “informal understandings” that were
codified and formalized in treaties, raising questions about how much discretion the designers of
the formal arrangements actually had.62 And Mattli’s article focuses on the selection by private
parties among alternative pre-existing methods of international commercial dispute resolution,
leaving unexamined the design of those institutions in the first place.63
These three cases may be interesting and important in their own right, but given the
abundance of situations that would clearly fit the project’s stated focus, it is puzzling that more
effort was not made to ensure that the cases were comparable in this respect. Of the remaining
five case studies, two “are primarily formal exercises”64 that contain little by way of empirical
material and thus have little to contribute to the assessment of the conjectures, while a third is
evenly divided between a formal extension of the framework and an examination of evidence.
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That leaves perhaps at best two or three articles that can offer systematic empirical evaluations of
the analytical framework.

B. Operationalization of the Variables
Further concerns about the comparability of the empirical cases arise from the way in
which the variables are handled. For the cases to generate useful findings, the variables must be
operationalized and measured in a consistent manner. It is not at all clear, however, whether this
is in fact the case.
The problem begins with the analytical framework, which offers no guidance on this vital
methodological issue to those who would attempt to evaluate the conjectures. This oversight
would seem to be especially regrettable insofar as most of the independent variables are both
relatively abstract and treated as potentially continuous in nature. For example, Koremenos,
Lipson, and Snidal write that “Uncertainty refers to the extent (emphasis added) to which actors
are not fully informed about others’ behavior, the state of the world, and/or others’
preferences.”65 Presumably, one can always find at least some evidence of uncertainty with
regard to each of these factors, especially in international relations. It becomes vital, then, to be
able to measure the extent of uncertainty, or at least to be able to distinguish with confidence
between high and low levels of uncertainty; otherwise, it effectively becomes a constant. Similar
sets of concerns attend the operationalization and measurement of enforcement problems, which
“refers to the strength (emphasis added) of individual actors’ incentives to cheat on a given
agreement or set of rules,”66 and of distribution problems, the “magnitude” (emphasis added) of
65
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which “depends on how each actor compares its preferred alternative to other actors’ preferred
alternatives.”67
The degree to which the variables are in fact measured in a consistent manner in the case
studies is difficult to ascertain. Although some authors provide separate discussions of their
characterizations of the variables, in other cases these are not at all highlighted and the reader
must hunt for them in the text. Nevertheless, some inconsistencies are readily apparent. For
example, Kydd focuses on the restrictiveness of NATO membership criteria, while Pahre
measures membership in terms of the number of states that actually join the trade regime.68 For
their part, Mitchell and Keilbach redefine scope in terms of the choice among three ideal-types of
bargains rather than the breadth of issues covered per se.69 There is somewhat more consistency
with regard to the handling of centralization – the degree to which important institutional tasks
are performed by a single focal entity – but here, too, one finds discrepancies, such as Morrow’s
inclusion of treaty negotiation and ratification as centralized tasks, Mattli’s treatment of
centralization as the degree to which arbitration takes place within pre-existing centers rather
than on an ad hoc basis, and Pahre’s equation of centralization with clustering.70
Ironically, one important source of consistency in measurement is itself a cause of further
problems: a pronounced tendency to treat the independent variables not as potentially continuous
but as dichotomous. Frequently, the authors of the empirical cases seem content to note simply
that distribution or enforcement problems exist or that various types of uncertainty are present
67
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rather than attempt to discern their extent, magnitude, or strength. This simplification, although
not mandated by the framework, may be necessary in practice, but it greatly limits the ability of
the project to explain variations in the wider range of values that can be assumed by the nondichotomous dependent variables.
A notable exception to this tendency is the article by Mitchell and Keilbach, which
explicitly examines variation in the severity of enforcement and distribution problems.71 Rather
than attempt to measure these directly, however, they focus on variation in the asymmetry of
externalities, which represents an amalgamation of the two types of cooperation problems. As a
result, it is not possible to establish directly the relationship between enforcement and
distribution problems, on the one hand, and the dependent variables of interest, on the other, and
thus to determine which independent variable, if any, exerts the most influence.

C. Overall Lack of Empirical Support
As a result of such problems with case selection and execution, the special issue is able to
offer at best a very limited evaluation of the conjectures and thus of the framework. This
conclusion follows in part from an examination of the frequency with which the conjectures
appear in the empirical chapters (see Table 1). In fact, a majority (nine of 16) are addressed in
two or fewer case studies. Of the remaining seven conjectures, four appear in three cases, two
appear in four cases, and one appears in five, while just one of the seven is consistently
supported by the evidence, according to the summary table of results.72
Notwithstanding this fact, Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal conclude that 11 of the
71
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conjectures received either strong, very strong, or extremely strong support. To be sure, no
canonical methodological criteria exist for making such judgments. Nevertheless, one might
expect a somewhat more qualified endorsement of the conjectures in view of the limited number
of cases in which they are addressed – five of the 11 are considered in only one or two cases.
The need for caution is further suggested by a partial review of the results as presented in
the case studies. For example, the second and third (of three) conjectures about the inclusiveness
of membership (designated M2 and M3) are said to receive strong support based on the findings
in two and three cases, respectively. Yet most if not all of these findings are problematic.
Kydd’s conclusion that restrictive NATO membership criteria are a response to uncertainty over
preferences, supporting M2, follows from a formal model in which differing levels of uncertainty
are assumed rather than from a careful examination of empirical evidence.73 Pahre, whose focus
is on centralization, discusses M3 only tangentially and explicitly acknowledges that he does not
test it formally.74 Morrow’s finding that the system of POW treaties supports M2 (“restrictive
membership increases with uncertainty about preferences”) is undercut by his observation that
the membership rules are not restrictive; the only states that are not members are those that
choose not to ratify the treaties.75 And Richard’s early observation that “intense distributional
concerns in postwar aviation markets led to inclusive membership, confirming conjecture M3" is
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at odds with the fact that the international markets were defined and largely regulated by
exclusive bilateral interstate agreements.76
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal also draw conclusions about the importance of the
different independent variables as possible guidance for future research. In particular, they are
struck by the relatively high frequency with which distributional concerns and uncertainty appear
in tests of the conjectures in the various cases, and with which those tests yield confirmations.77
The validity of such “findings” is highly dependent, however, on the representativeness and
appropriateness of the cases as well as how well they are executed, all of which can be
questioned.

IV. Conclusion
The Rational Design project represents a valuable contribution to the theoretical literature
on international institutions. In particular, it offers a useful foundation on which to build theories
about the particular forms that institutions take. As presented in the special issue, however, the
project contains a number of significant limitations. Some of these, such as the relatively limited
range of institutions to which it applies and the types of questions that are asked about them,
concern the scope of the project and are largely a matter of choice. All that may be required to
address such limitations is a more thorough and explicit discussion of the boundaries of the
enterprise.
Other existing weaknesses, however, especially those concerning the analytical
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framework and the attempts made thus far to evaluate it empirically, have directly impeded the
achievement of the project’s goal of offering a systematic account of institutional design
features. Consequently, they must be addressed if the project is to realize its full potential.
Fortunately, this task should not represent an insuperable challenge. The above discussion has
suggested that most, if not all, of these shortcomings are remediable.
Turning first to the framework, more thought needs to be given to both the dependent and
independent variables of interest before further empirical evaluation is attempted. Alternative
formulations of both sets of variables should be considered and discussed, with explicit reference
being made to other possibilities that can be found in the institutional literature. An attempt
should be made to relate such abstract phenomena as distribution and enforcement problems to
more fundamental -- if still somewhat intangible -- factors such as interests, power, and beliefs.
In addition, at least some of the current variables, notably centralization, would seem to require
further disaggregation before they can be applied fruitfully in empirical studies. As for the
conjectures, much more effort must be made to exploit the most distinctive feature of the project,
which is its attempt to bring together multiple dependent and independent variables within a
single analytical framework. In particular, given the resulting potential for multiple institutional
equilibria, significantly more attention needs to be given to possible interactions among the
variables.
With regard to the empirical evaluation of the framework, cases must be selected in
accordance with explicit, methodologically-sound criteria. It will be useful eventually to explore
how well the framework applies to norm-based institutional forms, case-by-case selection among
pre-existing institutional alternatives, and related phenomena like Pahre’s clustering. But given
that the Rational Design project is still in its early stages, empirical testing should be tightly
30

restricted to cases that are indisputably at the heart of the project’s ambit, namely the design of
explicit, negotiated, arrangements.
From a practical standpoint, it might also be advisable to focus initially on the evaluation
of a more limited number of conjectures as defined by subsets of the most important dependent
and independent variables. In the eight empirical articles contained in the special issue, for
example, some 22 of the 37 “tests” concerned the six conjectures associated with combinations
of three of the five dependent variables (membership, centralization, flexibility) and three of the
six independent variables (distribution, enforcement, uncertainty about the state of the world).78
Arguably, more useful results might have been obtained if the authors had been encouraged to
delve deeply into those questions rather than attempt to address all potentially relevant
conjectures. Nevertheless, such a strategy makes sense only if significant design trade-offs are
not expected to exist with other variables or cases can be chosen in such a way that other
variables are held constant.
Finally, it behooves the project organizers to develop and publicize explicit guidelines
with regard to how the variables might be operationalized and measured. Insofar as the project
remains under central direction, moreover, they might usefully review the way in which the
variables are handled in future case studies. Failing that, the development of a more standard
format for presenting descriptions of the variables and evaluations of the conjectures would
facilitate cross-case comparisons and external assessments.
78

In contrast, only 15 tests concerned the other 10 conjectures associated with the
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asymmetry of actors, uncertainty about behavior, uncertainty about preferences), making it more
difficult to evaluate them.
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Table 1: Conjectures

Severity of
Distribution
Problem
(9)

Severity of
Enforcement
Problem
(8)

Membership
Restrictiveness
(8)

M3
▼
(3)

Scope
(3)

Actors

Uncertainty

Number*
(4)

Asymmetry
(1)

Behavior
(3)

M1
▲
(3)

---

---

---

---

S2
▲
(2)

S3
▲
(1)

S1
▲
(0)

---

---

---

Centralization
(12)

---

C4
▲
(4)

C3
▲
(2)

---

C1
▲
(3)

C2
▲
(3)

Control
(4)

---

---

V1
▼
(1)

V2
▲
(1)

---

V3
▲
(2)

F2
▲
(4)

---

F3
▼
(1)

---

---

F1
▲
(5)

Flexibility
(10)

▲ indicates a positive relationship
▼ indicates a negative relationship
— indicates that no conjecture was offered
( ) indicates number of appearances in case studies
* Number may also refer to the heterogeneity of the actors
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